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Article 5

Comment

SEC Intervention
In Corporate Rehabilitation
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment analyzes the role of the Securities and Exchange
Comnission in corporate rehabilitation under the present Bankruptcy Act' and the proposed New Bankruptcy Act.2 Section II
examines why the SEC prefers a Chapter X bankruptcy proceeding3 over a Chapter XI bankruptcy proceeding 4 and how that
preference is effectuated. Section III gives an historical review of
the major cases in which the SEC forced companies to use Chapter
X, and attempts to derive a standard which courts will apply when
faced with a debtor that wants to use Chapter XI, and an SEC
recommendation for Chapter X. Finally, a critical analysis of the
effect of Chapter VII of the proposed New Bankruptcy Act and the
elimination of the SEC in corporate rehabilitation proceedings as
examined in Section IV. First, a general understanding of the
distinction between Chapter X and XI is necessary.
At some time, a financially distressed business debtor may seek
or be compelled to seek relief under the Bankruptcy Act. In most
cases, relief is sought under Chapters I-VII of the Bankruptcy Act,
and involves liquidation of assets, distribution to creditors and
complete discharge of debts. 5 Often, financial rehabilitation is
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970).
2. H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), established the Bankruptcy
Commission which two years later submitted a report consisting of
two parts. Part I contains an analysis of the present Bankruptcy law
with recommendations for changes and Part H contains the proposed
statute and notes. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
This proposed legislation will hereinafter be referred to as the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act.
3. Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276 (11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970)) (corporate
reorganization).
4. Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399 (11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970)) (arrangements).
5. The overwhelming number of business bankruptcies are straight liquidation proceedings under Chapters I-VII of the Bankruptcy Act. In-
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more desirable, and a Chapter X reorganization or a Chapter XI
arrangement may be invoked. Chapters X and XI are designed to
permit the financially troubled business to continue operation on
the theory that all the interested parties will benefit if the business
can be salvaged and preserved as a going concern. The procedures employed by these two chapters, however, do not afford
alternate routes to rehabilitation, but "are legally, mutually exclusive paths to ... financial rehabilitation." 6
The basic theory behind the application of Chapters X and XI
is that the going concern value of a debtor's assets is greater than
their liquidation value. Only when a debtor is hopelessly insolvent, and has little value as a going concern, should straight
bankruptcy be employed. Once it has been determined that rehabilitation is more advantageous than straight bankruptcy, there
must be a choice between Chapter X or Chapter XI. This determination is based on the needs and preferences of the debtor as
determined by the debtor in conjunction with its creditors and
possibly a trustee. Ultimately, this determination is subject to
review by the courts.
In general, Chapter X reorganizations are more appropriate for
large, publicly held corporations 7 with complicated debt structures
and where the interests of secured creditors and stockholders 8 will
be affected. Chapter XI arrangements are used in cases of smaller
corporate debtors, individuals or partnerships, 9 where a mere composition and extension of the claims of unsecured creditors is
necessary. Normally, a Chapter XI proceeding is preferable to a
Chapter X proceeding because it is less expensive, time consuming,
and does not require rigid administration by a court. Several more
specific distinctions are noteworthy.
There is an initial distinction as to who may file a petition
under each Chapter. A Chapter XI proceeding may be initiated
dicative of this is the fact that of the total number of 189,513 bankruptcy proceedings (business and nonfiscal year ending on June 30,
1974), 157,967 were straight bankruptcies. There were only 163 corporate reorganization proceedings under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, and 2,171 filings under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF T. UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS (table F2, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1974).
6. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965).
7. The provisions of Chapter XI are equally applicable to an individual
or to a partnership. Although Chapter X is only available to "corporations," the Bankruptcy Act defines this to include certain unincorporated companies and associations and any business conducted by trustees. Bankruptcy Act § 1 (8) (11 U.S.C. § 1 (8) (1970)).

8. Bankruptcy Act § 216 (11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970)).
9. Id. §§ 306(3), 321 (11 U.S.C. §§ 706(3), 721 (1970)).
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only by the voluntary act of the debtor, whereas a Chapter X
proceeding may be initiated either by the debtor or its creditors.
Another distinction involves the modification of creditors' rights.
An arrangement under Chapter XI can modify only the rights of
unsecured creditors,' 0 with no alteration of the rights of secured
creditors."
A reorganization under Chapter X, however, can
modify the rights of both secured and unsecured creditors. The
distinction with which the SEC is most concerned, when faced with
a chapter selection, is the appointment of an independent trustee.
Under Chapter XI the management of a debtor corporation prepares the arrangement and remains in control throughout the
proceeding. In sharp contrast, the preparation of a plan under
Chapter X is closely controlled by the court. Where the liabilities
of the debtor exceed $250,000, the appointment of an independent
trustee is mandatory.' 2 A trustee may be appointed at the discre10. Id. §§ 307(2), 356 (11 U.S.C. §§ 707(2), 756 (1970)).
11. This statement is not always true but depends upon the particular arrangement. A "creditor" includes "anyone who owns a debt, demand
or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly authorized
agent, attorney or proxy." Bankruptcy Act § 1(11) (11 U.S.C. § 1(11)
(1970)). Bankruptcy Act § 307(1) (11 U.S.C. § 707(1) (1970)), however, gives creditor a broader definition when itstates "'creditors'
shall include the holders of all unsecured debts, demands, or claims
whatever character against a debtor, whether or not provable as debts
under section 63 of this Act and whether liquidated or unliquidated,
fixed or contingent." Bankruptcy Act § 308 (11 U.S.C. § 708 (1970)),
involves the determination of what creditors are affected by an arrangement.
The meaning of the word "creditor," as used in §308 [11 U.S.C.
§ 708], depends on whether or not the arrangement provides
for an extension of time for payment of debts in full. If the
arrangement does not propose such extension, either to creditors generally or to some class of them, then "creditor" as
used in §308 [11 U.S.C. § 708] has the meaning given to it by
the definition of that word in §1(11) [11 U.S.C. § 1(11)]. If
the arrangement proposes an extension of time for payment
in full of all unsecured debts, then "creditor" as used in
§308 [11 U.S.C. § 708] has the meaning given to it by the definition of that word in §307(1) [11 U.S.C. § 707(1)]. If the
arrangement divides creditors into classes, and provides for
an extension of time payment in full of debts in one class,
but does not provide similarly for debts in the other class or
classes, then "creditor" as used in §308 [11 U.S.C. § 708] has
two meanings. When applied to creditors in the class whose
debts are to be extended, then "creditor" as used in §308 [11
U.S.C. § 708] has the meaning given to it by the definition in
§307(1) [11 U.S.C. § 707(1)]; when applied to creditors in
any other class, it has the meaning given to it by the definition in § 1(11) 11 U.S.C. § 1(11)].
8 COLLIE ON BANKRUPTCY
2.41 (14th ed. Moore 1974) (footnotes
omitted).
12. Bankruptcy Act § 156 (11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970)).
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tion of the court at any time. 13 The trustee has complete control
over the preparation of the plan of reorganization and has the
power to displace the management of the debtor corporation if
necessary.
These alternate routes of rehabilitation available under Chapters X and XI clearly afford the debtor and its creditors distinct
advantages and disadvantages. The mutual exclusivity of these
alternate means of rehabilitation is best expressed by an article
published shortly after the enactment of the Chandler Act.
Chapter X is reorganization in the grand manner. It represents
the response of its draftsmen to the great reorganization cases and
to the atmosphere of melodrama and importance which colors all
discussion of them ....

Chapter XI, on the other hand, has about

it the grubbiness of bankruptcy. It provides a cheap and practical

cannot
method of settlement . . . for poor debtors whose estates
4

afford the expense of an elaborate public ceremonial.'
II.

THE ROLE OF THE SEC IN

CORPORATE REHABILITATION
A.

Function of the SEC in Chapter X Reorganization

Having briefly examined the distinction between Chapter X
and Chapter XI, the initial question is why the SEC prefers a
Chapter X proceeding. This can be answered only after the role
of the SEC with respect to corporate rehabilitation is understood.
The SEC has virtually no function in Chapter XI proceedings. 15 In
contrast, the SEC performs a very integral role in all Chapter X
proceedings.' 6
13. Id.
14. Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L. J. 1334, 1334
(1939).

15. The Court in SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594
(1965), held that even though no expressed statutory rights and responsibilities were given to the SEC under Chapter XI, as was the
case with Chapter X, the SEC is still entitled to intervene and be heard
in a Chapter XI proceeding. The Court, however, failed to discuss
whether these SEC rights of intervention for Chapter XI were the
same or different as their rights under Chapter X. In fact, the Court
never really defined what rights of intervention the SEC had.
Also, if shareholders are solicited to accept some alteration of their
stock interest in a Chapter XI proceeding there is probably an antifraud Federal Securities problem and the solicitation would probably
be subject to the SEC's proxy rules. These functions are not provided
for in the Bankruptcy Act, but are governed by the Federal Securities
Laws.
16. It is interesting to note that the SEC was very instrumental in obtain-
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Many of the underlying purposes of the Securities Act, the
Securities Exchange Act, and the Bankruptcy Act are the same.
Apparently, Congress intended that courts and the SEC assist each
other in bankruptcy proceedings. As one court noted:
Both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a
et seq., and the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., are statutory enactments grounded primarily upon protection of the public interest in two different but overlapping areas of our economic
existence. To the extent that the fields mingle, it is apparent to
the Court that Congress has determined that there will be an embracing cooperation. 17
The participation of an administrative agency in judicial proceedings, is somewhat unique to bankruptcy. 18 As Roscoe Pound
noted:
It is another presupposition of administrative absolutism that a
reasonable adjustment of relations and regulation of conduct may
be attained by putting the guiding and regulating agency in the
position of a party to controversial situations, like the man who
intervenes in a brawl, not to stop the fight, but to go in and take
part in it on the side of one of the combatants. Many examples
might be cited. But one familiar to you is the Securities and Exchange Commission becoming a party to all important reorganizations, as provided in the Lea Bill.' 9
The close relationship between the recommendations of the SEC
and subsequent decisions by the courts demonstrates the courts'

reliance on the expertise of the SEC in the performance of their
statutory duties.
The SEC is entrusted with the function of "watchdog" for the
holders of public debt. This role is based on the assumption that
"the investing public dissociated from control or active participation in the management, needs impartial and expert administrative

assistance in the ascertainment of facts, in the detection of fraud,
and in the understanding of complex financial problems."AO In
other words, where public debt is present there is a need for an
investigation by an independent trustee, which is not provided for

17.
18.
19.
20.

ing congressional approval of Chapter X, while the National Association of Credit Men, whose alignment of interests is with small trade
creditors, was the primary impetus behind the passage of Chapter XI.
In re Otis & Co., 104 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
See Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U. Q. L. REv. 317 (1941).
Pound, Trend of the New Laws, 9 Ix-zsTvmNx BANr=G 24, 26 (1938).
Pound meant the Chandler Bill, which had just been enacted, not the
Lea Bill.
SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 44849 n.6 (1940).
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under Chapter XI. This is especially true when there is evidence
of fraud or incompetence on the part of management. In addition,
Chapter X subjects the debtor to a strict "fair and equitable" 21
standard not available under Chapter XI. Finally, Chapter X
requires a larger percentage of the creditors to approve the plan
than is required under Chapter XI, and the stockholders may be
required to approve a plan under Chapter X if the debtor is
solvent.
Thus, Chapter X provides the means by which the SEC is able
to effectuate its role as a public watchdog. Most of the SEC's
authority under Chapter X is derived from section 208.22 Under
this provision, the SEC serves as an advisor to the federal district
courts as a party to reorganization proceedings either at the request
or with the approval of the courts. The SEC is able to render
independent, expert advice and assistance to the courts, which
otherwise would be unavailable. Representatives of the SEC work
closely with the court-appointed trustees and their counsel and with
other interested parties in the resolution of problems and the
formulation of plans of reorganization. The SEC also makes
recommendations on the independence of trustees and their counsel, fee allowances to various parties, including the trustees and
their counsel, sales of properties and other assets, interim distributions to security holders, and other financial and legal matters. It
should be emphasized that the SEC's power is strictly advisory and
it has no power to enforce its findings or to make them binding on
the courts. The cases discussed in section III will demonstrate,
however, that the courts do rely heavily on the views expressed by
the SEC.
The authority given to the SEC to actively participate in the
early formulation of the plan for reorganization can be understood
in light of section 208 which also provides, "the Commission may
not appeal or file any petition for appeal in any such proceeding."'23 If the SEC were not given extensive input early in the
reorganization proceeding, its effectiveness would be drastically
impaired. Conversely, the denial of a right to appeal forces the
SEC to participate early in the proceedings, when its expertise can
be most beneficial. This restriction, however, does not forbid or
prevent the SEC from participating in appeals taken by other
parties, which in fact the SEC considers part of its function in
Whatever the intent, the result has been to
reorganization.2
21. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2) (11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970)).
22. Id. § 208 (11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970)).

23. Id.

24. See, e.g., In re Postal Telegraph & Cable, 119 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1941);
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guarantee the participation of the SEC from the time of the initial
filing of the bankruptcy petition.
One of the primary functions of the SEC in the formulation of
the plan of reorganization is to provide "fair and equitable" treatment for the various creditors and security holders and to help
assure that the plan is "feasible" and will permit the corporation to
emerge from the rehabilitation financially sound. To achieve these
goals, the SEC may undertake a thorough study and analysis of
the debtor's past operations, its financial condition, its past earning
power and its competitive position in the particular industry. In
a case where the liabilities of the corporate debtor exceed its
assets by greater than $3,000,000, Chapter X requires the SEC to
prepare and submit a report as to the fairness and flexibility of the
plan. 25 This report is filed with the court for its assistance and is
distributed among the creditors and security holders to enable them
to exercise an informal judgment in considering whether to vote for
or against acceptance of the plan. 28 The court will not enter
judgment until it has received a report from the27SEC or until it has
been notified that the SEC will not file a report.
Keeping in mind that the SEC has very limited authority under
a Chapter XI proceeding, it is clear that the SEC would prefer to
exert its broader powers in a Chapter X proceeding. There it can
act to protect larger numbers of public investors. The SEC,
however, can not force a debtor into Chapter X unless a petititon
was filed previously under Chapter XI. Then, the SEC can file a
motion to have the debtor's petition dismissed, or, if the debtor
voluntarily amends its petition to comply with the requirements of
In re Sheridan View Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 532 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 737 (1945).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 172 (11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970)).
26. Id. § 175 (11 U.S.C. § 575 (1970)). This so-called "175 package"
exempts from the proxy requirements of Rule 14a (2) (E) of the
Commission's Proxy Rules and Regulations under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970), all materials forwarded to shareholders pursuant to this provision. Bankruptcy Act
§ 264 (11 U.S.C. § 664 (1970)), exempts § 5 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970), which requires the registration
of securities, from the application of Chapter X. Similarly, Bankruptcy Act § 393 (11 U.S.C. § 793 (1970)) exempts application of §
5 of the Securities Act of 1933 to Chapter XI proceedings. For a comprehensive discussion of the effect of the SEC registration requirements on the Bankruptcy Act, see Corotto, Debtor Relief Proceedings
under the Bankruptcy Act and the Securities Act of 1933: The Registration Requirement and Its Implications, 47 Am. BANK. L.J. 183
(1973).
27. Bankruptcy Act § 173 (11 U.S.C. § 573 (1970)).
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Chapter X, the SEC can move to have the proceeding transferred
to Chapter X.
B.

SEC Intervention in Chapter XI Arrangements

If a corporate debtor files a petition under Chapter XI and the
SEC believes the rehabilitation belongs to Chapter X, the SEC can
file a motion with the court pursuant to section 32828 of Chapter
XI requesting a dismissal or a transfer to Chapter X. Section 328
provides that the SEC or any party in interest, including creditors,
may apply to the court to have the Chapter XI petition dismissed
unless, (1) it is amended to comply with Chapter X by a certain
date, or (2) an involuntary creditor's petition is filed under Chapter X. It either of these latter events occurs, the Chapter XI
petition will not be dismissed and, in order to preserve continuity,
the Chapter X petition will be considered to have been filed at the
time the Chapter XI petition was filed. In most cases, the corporate debtor will amend its Chapter XI petition voluntarily to comply with Chapter X. The difficulty with this procedure arises
when the court must determine the standards to be applied in a
section 328 motion by the SEC.
The purpose of section 328 can be understood better after
looking at its legislative history.29 Congress had two primary
reasons for adopting section 328 in 1952. The first reason was to
30
codify the SEC v. United States Realty and Improvement Co.
decision which permitted the SEC to intervene on behalf of public
investors. The second reason was to adopt a trasnfer procedure
complimentary to section 14731 of Chapter X, which provides for
transfers to Chapter XI. Neither reason manifested any congressional intent to have the SEC serve as a watchdog for the public
investors in rehabilitation proceedings.
The assumption until this time has been that a section 328
motion by the SEC should be granted if it would be in the interests
of public investors. However, it has been argued that a Chapter X
proceeding, as invoked by the SEC, may in fact have the effect of
an antirehabilitation statute. This is because the rigidity of a
Chapter X proceeding may cause a potentially successful Chapter
XI arrangement, that has been transferred to a Chapter X proceeding under section 328, to result in liquidation of the debtor. The
debtor generally experiences a loss of management and an unwill28. Id. § 328 (11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970)).
29. [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960.
30. 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
31. Bankruptcy Act § 147 (11 U.S.C. § 547 (1970)).

CORPORATE REHABILITATION

ingness of new investors to follow an extensive Chapter X proceeding. Although these factors might indicate that a Chapter XI
proceeding should be preferred, the existence of public debt may
influence courts to transfer the proceeding to Chapter X where an
independent trustee can be appointed. It becomes apparent, therefore, that what is in the best interests of the public investors may
not necessarily be in the best interests of the debtor or other

creditors.
The issue thus becomes whether the presence of public debt
should cause the automatic transfer of a proceeding to Chapter X
at the expense of the debtor's rehabilitation. It is possible that a
forced liquidation would not be in the best interests of the public
debt holders as well as other creditors and the debtor. The
question is: what standards should the court apply when presented with a section 328 motion?
III.

JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR
SEC INTERVENTION

It would appear from this examination of the distinction between the alternate routes of rehabilitation that Chapter XI generally is more suitable for small corporations or individual businesses,
whereas Chapter X is geared toward large corporations with complicated debt structures. Traditionally, the size of a corporate
debtor was thought to provide a rough estimate of which chapter
was appropriate for a bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy
Act, however, provides no formula to determine whether corporate
debtors should be rehabilitated under Chapter X or Chapter XI.

Due to this lack of guidance, the courts are faced with an especially
difficult problem each time a medium-sized corporation seeks rehabilitation under Chapter XI and the SEC moves to dismiss or
transfer the petition to Chapter X. As one commentator
wrote: "The 'general principles' approach has led most of the
writers in this area to conduct a frantic
search for the criteria of
'
removal from Chapter XI to Chapter X. 32
There does appear to be one factor which manifests itself in
most Chapter selection cases. It is the common knowledge that
the heart and soul and success of a business depends upon its
management. 33 A common cause of corporate collapse is fraudulent or inept management. Evidence of such mismanagement
would favor a Chapter X proceeding which provides much closer
32. 37 COLO. L. REv.500, 502 (1965).

33. Katskee, The Calculus of Corporate Reorganization Chapter X v. XI
and The Role of the SEC Assessed, 45 AM,B -F..L.J. 171 (1971).
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judicial scrutiny in the development of a plan to rehabilitate the
debtor, and authorizes a trustee to take over the management of the
corporate debtor. In contrast, a Chapter XI proceeding permits
the debtor's management to remain in control. This is not to say
that a mere suspicion of mismanagement is sufficient to transfer a
Chapter XI proceeding to Chapter X. Actual evidence of either
fraudulent or inept management is required. An historical review
of the cases in this area puts the effect of mismanagement on
chapter selection into a better perspective.
A.

United States Realty: The Fair and Equitable Standard

The landmark case in the area of SEC intervention in corporate
34
rehabilitation is SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.
This case established the precedent for future intervention by the
SEC in a corporate rehabilitation proceeding. Mismanagement
was not at issue in this case but the court did express its distaste for
the corporation's "frequent adoption of plans which favored management at the expense of other interests." 35 The Supreme Court
faced two issues: (1) whether adequate relief was available under Chapter XI and (2) whether the SEC, absent statutory authority, was permitted to intervene on behalf of the public debt holders.
The Court resolved the first issue by holding that a corporation
with public debt holders could file a petition under Chapter XI,
provided the plan had no effect on the interests of the public debt
holders. The Court concluded, however, that the complicated
debt structure of the debtor prevented consummation of a feasible
plan of rehabilitation under Chapter XI without readjustment of
the public debt holders' interest. The Court also concluded that
the SEC could intervene in a Chapter XI proceeding even though
there was no direct statutory authority under the Bankruptcy Act.
As the Court stated,
[W]e think it plain that the Commission has a sufficient interest
in the maintenance of its statutory authority and the performance
of its public duties to entitle it through intervention to prevent
reorganizations, which should rightly be subjected to its scrutiny,
from proceeding without it.36
With the exception of Justice Roberts's dissent in United
States Realty, the authority of the SEC to intervene in Chapter XI
proceedings never was challenged seriously. Eventually, in 1952,
Congress added section 32837 to the Bankruptcy Act which author34.
35.
36.
37.

310 U.S. 434 (1940).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 460.
Bankruptcy Act § 328 (11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970)).
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ized intervention by the SEC in Chapter XI proceedings. It is
noteworthy that section 366 was amended simultaneously, 38 and
the Chapter XI requirement of "fair and equitable" was changed to
"the best interests of the creditor." Congress had recognized that
the "fair and equitable" standard was incongruous with the purpose of a Chapter XI proceeding. 39 United States Realty was
decided when section 366 of Chapter XI still contained the "fair
and equitable" standard requiring readjustment of stock holdings,
which could not be effectuated under the Chapter XI plan. The
question arose whether United States Realty should be limited to its
own facts and no longer adhered to, since the "fair and equitable"
standard had been eliminated from Chapter XI. As later cases
demonstrated, the spirit of United States Realty lived on, without
concern' over the statutory amendment to section 366.
It was sixteen years before the Supreme Court faced the issue
of chapter selection again. The circuit courts, however, decided
two relatively minor cases in the interim. The first case, Mecca
Temple v. Darrock, 40 was the only other case decided prior to the
1952 revisions to the Bankruptcy Act. The debtor, a fraternal
society, filed a petition under Chapter XI proposing to pay each
bondholder ten per cent over a period of years. The referee
dismissed the petition, holding that it should be transferred to
Chapter X. The Second Circuit affirmed, citing United States
Realty as authority, and holding that the "fair and equitable"
doctrine prevented Chapter XI from providing adequate relief for
the public debt holders. Although mismanagement was not a
factor in Mecca Temple, it was important in the later case of In re
Transvision, Inc. 41

This case

involved 385,000

shares

of

out-

38. Id. § 366 (11 U.S.C. § 766 (1970)).
39. The courts have interpreted "fair and equitable" to require a division
of creditors and stockholders into classes where the claim of each class,
from the senior to junior classification, must be fully satisfied before
another class may receive payment on their obligations. In essence,
this strict or absolute priority rule requires that parties affected by
the reorganization be allowed to retain the advantage of their respective priorities. Clearly this is incongruous with a Chapter XI proceeding which does not.attempt to adjust the interests of public debt holders. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
See also Note, The Role of the SEC in Corporate Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 631.
The new standard for Chapter XI proceedings, subsequent to the
1952 revision, is the "best interests of the creditors" which means only
that under Chapter XI the creditors must receive a value greater than

they would receive under a forced liquidation. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTcy
9.17 (14th ed. Moore 1975). See also In re Peoples Loan &

Inv. Co., 410 F.2d 851, 857 n.6 (8th Cir. 1969).
40. 142 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 784 (1945).
41. 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
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standing common stock, of which the management owned 250,000
shares. The balance was owned by 425 public investors. The
debtor initiated a plan under Chapter XI which provided for the
liquidation of all unsecured debts over $50 at a rate of 2 per cent
each month for fifty months, leaving unaffected the rights of
stockholders and secured creditors. The court denied the SEC's
petition to transfer the proceeding to Chapter X because it believed
that the desired financial condition could be achieved under Chapter XI.
The SEC has adduced no information which would tend to indicate
that the plan is likely to fail, but has, at most, indicated that there
may be some basis for suspecting possible improprieties in past
management. Certainly, so ephemeral a suspicion is not an adequate basis upon which to overturn a plan .... 42
Thus the court expressed its willingness to consider management as a factor in chapter selection, but the evidence must consist
of more than a mere suspicion. One year later, the Supreme Court
again was confronted with the issue of chapter selection.
B.

General Stores Corp.: The "Needs" Test

In General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 43 the debtor initiated a
Chapter XI arrangement under which he proposed a 40 per cent
settlement with each of his unsecured creditors. One stockholder
out of 7,000, holding only 3,000 of 2,322,422 outstanding shares,
together with the SEC, moved to dismiss the proceeding unless it
was amended to comply with Chapter X. The Court, relying on
its previous decision in United States Realty, affirmed the decision
to transfer the proceeding to Chapter X. Justice Douglas developed what he called a "needs test" for determining which chapter
was appropriate for a corporate rehabilitation.
The character of the debtor is not the controlling consideration in
a choice between c. X and c. XI. Nor is the nature of the capital
structure. It may well be that in most cases where the debtor's
securities are publicly held c. X will afford the more appropriate
remedy. But that is not necessarily so. A large company with
publicly held securities may have as much need for a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller company. And there is
no reason we can see why c. XI may not serve that end. The
and the large
essential difference is not between the small company
44
company but between the needs to be served.
Justice Douglas proceeded to explain that these "needs to be
served" included such factors as (1) the need to readjust the
42. Id. at 247.
43. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
44. Id at 466.
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corporate debts which, without any sacrifice by stockholders, may
violate the fair and equitable plan, (2) the need for management
to account for its misdeeds, and (3) the need for new management
to avoid a later collapse of the corporation. Clearly these needs,
which would require a transfer to Chapter X, incorporate management as the primary determinative factor. In the case at bar,
Justice Douglas found that the debtor had experienced a rocky
history and "either an improvident overextension or a business that
has been out of step with modern trends."°4 5 Enlightened by the
opinion of Justice Douglas, the circuit courts began to give more
serious consideration to the management factor in chapter selection
cases.
In SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp.,46 the Sixth Circuit unanimously
affirmed the denial of an SEC application to transfer a Chapter XI
proceeding to Chapter X. The court held that the standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in General Stores had been applied
properly by thet district judge. The court emphasized its failure to
apply the fair and equitable rule, the recommendation of the
creditor's committee that present management be retained, and the
adherence to the Transvision and General Stores cases as the factors
on which it relied. The court held that the instant case did not
require a pervasive reorganization as was necessary in the General
Stores case. It began to appear that with the foundation of Transvision and Wilcox-Gay, the courts were beginning to give greater
consideration to the retention of the management of a corporate
debtor when no demonstration of management misconduct had
been shown.
In the following year, in SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp.,4 7 the
Second Circuit applied the doctrine evoked by General Stores to
grant an SEC application for dismissal or voluntary transfer from
Chapter XI to Chapter X. This particular debtor already had
been through two proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act and was
seeking a modification of the claims of the public debenture holders. The court held that there was more than a mere suspicion of
mismanagement because a sufficient record of discretionary mismanagement had been demonstrated. It was on these grounds that
the court initially distinguished this case from Transvision and
Wilcox-Gay.48 The court noted that a full investigation of the
situation which was available only under Chapter X, was imperative because the "facts now of record suggest the possibility that an
45. Id. at 467.
46. 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
47. 240 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).

48. Id. at 516 n.10.
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independent trustee's investigation might also reveal a need for 'an
accounting from the management for misdeeds' which caused the
present necessity of a further reorganization." 49 Thus the courts
appeared to be evolving a standard which required all rehabilitation cases containing sufficient evidence of mismanagement be
filed under Chapter X. In the absence of such a showing, the
courts left the proceeding in Chapter XI.
Six years later, the Second Circuit permitted another corporate
debtor to remain under Chapter XI. In Grayson-Robinson Stores,
Inc. v. SEC,50 there was no publicly held debt to be adjusted, and a
strong creditor's committee, which was receptive to the contributions of stockholder interests, had been formed. The debtor was a
nationwide chain of retail apparel stores which had expanded
without increasing its equity base and long term financing. The
court held that the interests of the debtor were best served by
Chapter XI: "[T]he possibility that new management is sorely
needed is suggested from the fact that until November, 1960, when
the present management gained control of Grayson, the debtor had
enjoyed many consecutive years of profitable operation."'51 This
case should not be considered as an exception to the Liberty
Baking Corp. approach to the factor of management, but is at most
an anomaly.
In two other cases, before the Supreme Court was again faced
with the issue, appellate courts affirmed motions by the SEC to
transfer Chapter XI proceedings to Chapter X. In SEC v. Crumpton Builders, Inc.,52 the debtor, a shell house builder, suffered
severe losses when the shell house market sharply declined shortly
after the corporation went public. The court held the motion to
dismiss or transfer the proceeding to Chapter X was dismissed
improperly by the district court because the plan of arrangement
was inequitable to the creditors. The court decided that various
criteria had emerged from the previous cases which required that
"there should be no particular need for recapitalization or replacement of management. There should be no indication of unfair or
treacherous dealings by management or any other group standing
to gain by the arrangement."5 3 Also in 1964, the case of SEC v.
Canandaigua Enterprises Corp.54 was decided in the Second Circuit. This case involved a bankrupt race track in which the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 515.
320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 951.
337 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 912.
339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964).
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petition to transfer the petition from Chapter XI to Chapter X was

granted over the objection of the stockholders and creditors who
felt the proposed arrangement would not meet the "fair and equitable" standard of Chapter X. The Court in General Stores regretted that it had to order a proceeding not favored by creditors or

stockholders, but concluded that it was forced to follow the "needs
test" which the court found
emphasized the need to determine on the facts of the case whether
the formulation of a plan under the control of the debtor, as provided by c. XI, or the formulation of a plan under the auspices of
disinterested trustees, as assured by c. X and the other protective
provisions of that chapter, would better serve "the public and private interests concerned including those of the debtor." 55
In applying the "needs test," as first articulated in General Stores,
the court relied on the presumption in favor of Chapter X where
there is a need for readjustment of the public debt, and avoided the
issue of management misconduct.
C.

TrailerRentals

Finally, we arrive at what has been the last expos6 by the
Supreme Court on the issue of chapter selection. In SEC v.
American Trailer Rentals Co.,5 6 the debtor was engaged in the
business of trailer rentals. The company was financed through the
sale of trailers to investors, and by the lease-back of the trailers for
a 2 per cent return on investment each month for ten years. In
1961, the SEC stepped in to halt these sale and leaseback arrangements on the theory that securities were involved that could not be
sold to the public until the necessary registration statement was
filed by the debtor. An attempt to meet this requirement failed
due to SEC's suspicion of false and misleading statements in the
offered material. The company then filed a Chapter XI petition.
At that time, its liabilities exceeded its assets by $682,282. The
recommendation by the referee for a Chapter XI arrangement was
adopted by both the district and circuit courts, although both
courts recognized that the debtor's officers would have effective
control over the corporation after the arrangement, and preferential
treatment was being given to the banks. The Supreme Court, in
what amounted to a treatise of all the law to date, unanimously
reversed the lower courts' opinions. Justice Goldberg, writing the
opinion, reaffirmed the principles of United States Realty and
GeneralStores by holding that,
55. 350 U.S. 462, 465 (1956)
310 U.S.434, 455 (1940)).
56. 379 U.S. 594 (1965).

(quoting SEC v. United States Realty Co.,

650

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 3 (1977)
the "needs to be served" included such factors as requirements of
fairness to public debt holders, need for a trustee's evaluation of
an accounting from management or determination that new management is necessary, and the need to readjust a complicated debt
requiring more than a simple composition of unsecured
structure
5
debt. 7

The Supreme Court thus reaffirmed the importance of the management of a corporate debtor by incorporating this factor in the
"needs" test.
American Trailer Rentals made it clear that Chapter X and
Chapter XI are "legally mutually exclusive paths to . . . financial
rehabilitation 5' 8 and are not alternate routes. The courts, when
faced with an SEC motion to intervene, must then determine which
proceeding is appropriate. Several appellate court cases were decided since the American TrailerRentals case.
Before 1965 had ended, the First Circuit faced this issue in
SEC v. Burton.59 The SEC appealed the denial of its motion
under section 328. 60 The court withheld its opinion until the
Supreme Court had decided the American Trailer Rentals case,
and remanded the case to the district court "to review the factual
situation as it is now in the light of the criteria for the exercise of
discretion as developed by the Court in SEC v. American Trailer
Rentals Co. .... "I On remand, however, the district court stood
by its previous ruling and again denied the SEC's motion to
dismiss. 6 2 The court distinguished this case from American Trailer Rentals on four grounds. First, in Burton there was only a
minor adjustment of public debt. Second, there was no misconduct
on the part of past management. Third, new management now
operated the business; and finally, a transfer to Chapter X "could
well lead to disaster for the subordinated creditors and stockholders
of the debtor. ' 63 The SEC alleged that mismanagement was a
contributing factor to the financial difficulties of Burton, but the
court held that this had not been adequately demonstrated and new
management had since taken over.
Four years later, the appellate courts were again confronted
with the issue of chapter selection. In In re Peoples Loan &
Investment Co. of Fort Smith,6 4 the debtor was forced to file a
57. Id. at 610.
58. Id. at 607.
59. 342 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1965).

60. In re American Guar. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 961 (D.R.I. 1963).
61. SEC v. Burton, 342 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1965).
62. In re American Guar. Corp., 246 F. Supp. 322 (D.R.I. 1965).

63. Id. at 327.
04. 410 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1969).
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petition under Chapter XI as a result of a run on its deposits
caused by a suit brought by the SEC against a similar, though
unrelated, loan and thrift company located in the same area. The
SEC filed a section 328 motion which the district court denied.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, based on its application of the needs
test as set forth in General Stores and American Trailer Rentals.
The court held that in most cases where public debt is involved, the
needs test will balance in favor of Chapter X, though "there are
exceptions to the general rule that where public investor creditors
are involved Chapter X is the proper proceeding. But as Shlensky
and Trailer Rentals indicate, the exceptions are held within very
narrow limits." 65 In addition the court based its decision on
"much evidence of mismanagement and self-dealing, particularly
66
in regard to the mortgage holding on the shell homes."
That same year, the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar chapter
selection case in Norman Finance & Thrift Corp. v. SEC.67 The
debtor in this case, as in Peoples, was a loan and thrift company
which found itself with an operating deficit of $400,000. Norman
filed a petition under Chapter XI and the SEC quickly filed a
motion under section 328 to have the proceeding transferred to
Chapter X. The district court denied the motion, but on appeal
the circuit court reversed, relying upon United States Realty, General Stores, and American Trailer Rentals. The court reasoned
that the problems of mismanagement by officers and the drastic
adjustment of the rights of depositor-creditors, which were not
present in the Peoples case, justified the need for a stricter Chapter
X proceeding. In both Peoples and Norman the majority of the
public debt holders voted in favor of the Chapter XI proceeding,
but in both cases the courts ruled to transfer the proceedings to
Chapter X. But in both cases there was also actual evidence of
mismanagement on which the selection of Chapter X could be
justified.
The two most recent cases on chapter selection indicate that the
SEC may have reevaluated its policy with respect to this issue. In
these cases the SEC appeared to step back from its role as glan vital
to a more passive role.66 In Posi-Seal International,Inc., v. Chipperfield,69 a stockholder holding 11 percent of the company's stock
65. Id. at 858.
66. Id.
67. 415 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1969).

68. See 36 SEC ANx. REP. 194-200 (1970); 37 SEC ANN. REP. 195-203
(1971); 38 SEC ANN. REP. 126-28 (1972); 40 SEC ANN. REP. 130-32
(1974); 41 SEC ANw. REP. 158-62 (1975).
69. 457 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1972).
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filed a petition for review of a Chapter XI confirmation order
pursuant to section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.7 0 His contention was that the arrangement involved the "'affection' of stock71
holder rights" and should properly be brought under Chapter X.
The district court adopted the conclusions of the referee and
upheld the confirmation order. The Second Circuit was concerned
with the issue of whether the proceeding was properly brought
under Chapter XI and requested an amicus curiae brief from the
SEC as to whether the district court had abused its discretion. The
brief stated that the SEC found no error in the confirmation of the
plan. In affirming the denial by the district court of the petition
for review, the court stated: "While we realize that the court
below did not have 'open ended' discretion to determine between
of the
Chapter X and XI, the guiding principles of rehabilitation
72
debtor and the public investors have been served here.
Finally, in In re KDI Corp., 73 the SEC again was not the
movant for a dismissal or transfer to Chapter X. The debtor was a
large publicly-owned holding company. It reported net sales of
$140 million and earnings of $5.3 million in 1969, but it was
unable to meet its current obligations in August, 1970. KDI then
filed a petition under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act and a
proposed plan of arrangement. Two investors filed a section 328
motion arguing the "circumstances and capital structure of the
debtor were such that the relief afforded by Chapter XI is inadequate" 74 and the proceeding should have been brought under
Chapter X. The district court denied the investor's motion and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court found that KDI had taken many
drastic and effective steps to correct past mistakes by getting rid of
bad investments, obtaining a new management team, and renegotiating its agreements with the banks. Because the SEC was
familiar with the KDI proceedings, and yet it had not seen fit to
join in the motion to dismiss or transfer the proceeding to Chapter
X, the court concluded there was no threat to the interests of the
public investors, and therefore, no need to transfer the proceeding
out of Chapter XI. In addition to the SEC taking a more passive
role the failure to produce any convincing proof of mismanagement
was again a major consideration.
In addition to supplying new management, a trustee is frequently
needed to investigate past mismanagement, fraud or breach of
70. Bankruptcy Act § 39(c) (11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1970)).
71. 457 F.2d at 238.
72. Id. at 240.
73. 477 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 730.
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trust by officers or directors. While KDI has suffered from bad
management in the sense of poor business judgment and insuf-

ficient financial controls and accounting practices, the appellants
failed to produce convincing proof of any fraud or bad faith.75

D. Summary
Looking at these cases in retrospect, each court of last resort
upheld the section 328 motion when evidence of mismanagement
was sufficiently demonstrated. United States Realty layed the
foundation for SEC intervention in chapter selection. Fifteen
years later, beginning with Transvision and running through KDI,
the integrity and competence of the management of a corporate
debtor appeared to be the only common thread bringing any
semblence of order to this area of apparent chaos. Every case in
which the court of last resort denied a section 328 motion, no
substantial evidence of mismanagement was demonstrated to the
court. It is important to keep in mind that most of the evidence
presented in chapter selection cases is provided by the SEC. The
courts, therefore, must rely heavily on SEC recommendations.
Considering the judicial reliance on SEC recommendations, the
less active role taken by the SEC in recent chapter selection cases
has resulted in fewer section 328 transfer cases. As noted, the two
most recent cases, Posi Seal and KDI, were both initiated by
investors instead of by the SEC, and in both cases the section 328
motion was denied. Whether the more passive role of the SEC is
the result of an enlightened attitude toward the ability of a debtor
and its creditors to make satisfactory arrangements, or from a lack
of manpower to review all the cases, there is no indication that this
trend will not continue. However, should Congress vote to adopt
the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, this entire area of case law
would be no more than history.
IV. CHAPTER VII OF THE PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY
ACT AND THE SEC'S ROLE IN CORPORATE
REHABILITATION
As mentioned at the outset, the basic theory behind the application of Chapters X and XI is that the going concern value of a
debtor's assets is greater than their liquidation value. Chapter VII
of the proposed New Bankruptcy Act consolidates Chapters X, XI
and XII and eliminates any opportunity for chapter selection. 76
The proposed New Bankruptcy Act, if adopted, would supplant the present Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Commission on
75. Id. at 734.
76. The discussion of Chapter VII of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act,
supra note 2, will be limited to the role of the bankruptcy administrator and the elimination of the SEC from rehabilitation proceedings.
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Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was formed by congressional
resolution in response to the urgent need to update the bankruptcy
system to conform to the realities of our present economy. Under
the Act, independent courts of bankruptcy would be established
separate from the United States district courts and would have
jurisdiction over all controversies arising under the Act, with the
exception of criminal cases. 77 In addition, the Commission has
recommended the creation of a new, independent agency to be
known as the "United States Bankruptcy Administration" which
would be headed by a bankruptcy administrator appointed by the
President for a term of seven years subject to confirmation by the
Senate. The administrator would be authorized to appoint a deputy, regional administrators and such other officers as he would find
necessary in a system of organization that is responsible "for
efficient, effective, and economical conduct of the business and
affairs of the Administration.17 8 The Commission has proposed
two principal reasons for creating the office of bankruptcy
administrator: (1) it hopes to eliminate conflict between the
judicial and the administrative responsibilities of the bankruptcy
judge and79 (2) it hopes to increase uniformity in bankruptcy proceedings.
Judicial or Administrative Duties?
The separation of the judicial and administrative functions of
the bankruptcy judge was a major concern of the Commission.
Under the present system, the bankruptcy judge, in the exercise of
his administrative duties, must work very closely with the trustee
and the lawyer of the debtor in supervising the debtor's estate. At
the same time, the judge is required to exercise nonpartial judicial
discretion. Over a period of time the judge can not avoid becoming friendly with the attorneys who regularly appear before him
representing debtors. Even if impropriety does not exist, the
present system is far from conducive to the customary adversary
proceeding which is so basic to our judicial system. The summary
proceeding under the present system has been strongly criticized. 80
The mere potential for unfairness should be a sufficient basis to
A.

77. Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, supra note 2, §§ 2-101, 2-201, 2-202.

The proposed bankruptcy courts would be patterned largely after the
United States Tax Court. Compare id. §§ 2-102, 2-103, 2-104 (pertaining to Bankruptcy judges) with 26 U.S.C. §§ 7443, 7447, 7448 (1970)

(pertaining to tax court judges).
78. Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, supra note 2, § 3-102 (b).
79. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Part I contains
the Commission's report) [hereinafter cited as the Report].
80. See Treister, Summary Judgment Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is it too
Summary?, 39 U.S. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1966).
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dictate the need for a separation of the functions of the bankruptcy
judge. As the Commission itself stated:
[T]he Commission believes that making an individual responsible
for conduct of both administrative and judicial aspects of a bankruptcy case is incompatible with the proper performance of the
judicial function. Even if a paragon of integrity were sitting on
a bench and could keep his mind and feelings insultated from influences which arise from his previous official connections with
the case before him and with one of the parties to it, he probably
could not dispel the appearance 81of a relationship which might compromise his judicial objectivity.
The opponents of the proposed New Bankruptcy Act agree that
there is a need to eliminate the conflict between the judicial and
administrative responsibilities of a bankruptcy judge; however,
they argue that the Commission's proposal of a Bankruptcy Administrator would merely shift the conflict to the Bankruptcy Administrator, thus defeating the underlying purpose of the separation of the judicial and administrative responsibilities. As Conrad
Cyr noted: "The paradox presented therefore is that the 'United
States Bankruptcy Administration,' created principally to eliminate
real and apparent conflicts on the part of the bankruptcy court,
would become an executive compendium of conflicting interests,
powers and responsibilities.8 2 Cyr proposed a segregation of the
clerical staffs of the local bankruptcy courts from the bankruptcy
judges by placing these clerical
staffs in the administrative office of
88
the United States courts.
The proponents of the proposed New Bankruptcy Act assert
that Cyr's proposal is not a viable solution to the need for separation of judicial and administrative responsibilities. They argue
that the clerical staffs would be exercising mere ministerial duties.
The duties performed by an administrator under the proposed
New Bankruptcy Act, on the other hand, would not be ministerial.
The administrator would have the authority to exercise independent discretion in the day to day problems of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Though both the opponents and proponents of the proposed
New Bankruptcy Act concur in the need for the separation of the
duties of the bankruptcy judge, there is little agreement as to how
this best can be accomplished. The opponents of the Act argue
that the enormous amount of discretion given the bankruptcy
administrator in effect merely shifts the conflict from the judge to
the administrator. The proponents, on the other hand, argue that
81. Report, supra note 79, at 93-94.
82. Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48
Am. BANKR. L. J.45, 63-64 (1974).

83. Id. at 59.
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any alternative solution creates only ministerial duties in the administrators and the real discretion still remains with the judge.
The arguments on both sides are strong, and ultimate resolution of
the issue should come from Congress.
B.

Uniformity in Bankruptcy Proceedings
The other major improvement the Commission hoped to
achieve by placing the administrative duties in the hands of a
bankruptcy administrator was to bring uniformity to the actual
practice and procedure of bankruptcy throughout the United
States. Under the present system, each bankruptcy judge has his
own procedure for administering the estate of a debtor. The lack
of uniformity under the present system allows debtors to be treated
differently, depending upon the jurisdiction in which the action is
brought. Through the establishment of an independent agency
which would be responsible for the administration of all bankruptcy proceedings, the hope is that debtors all over the country will be
treated uniformly.
This recommendation for a national office of a bankruptcy
administrator has met with strong objection in the legal community
and is considered the most controversial provision of the proposed
New Bankruptcy Act. The argument against an independent
bankruptcy agency headquartered in Washington, D.C., is that it
can not possibly be responsive to the difficult and pressing problems of corporate debtors across the country. The fear is that the
agency would become merely part of the federal bureaucracy,
incapable of handling the urgencies of corporate rehabilitation.
The bankruptcy administrator would have the power to appoint a
trustee virtually at will.8 4 Once a trustee has been appointed his
duties would encompass the formulation of a plan of reorganization.s5 The bankruptcy administrator, however, retains the authority to decide whether the debtor may continue the operation of
his business. 86 This tremendous concentration of discretionary
authority, it is argued, is totally inimical to the self-help theories
which serve as a basis for 'Chapter X reorganizations and Chapter
XI arrangements. The objections to the bankruptcy administrator
are summarized in an article by Weintraub and Levin:
The heart and pulse of bankruptcy is contained in the chapter proceedings. Our economy is dependent upon flexible bankruptcy
laws which can give insolvent debtors an opportunity to survive
with going-concern values with the aid of debtor support. It is
84. Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, supra note 2, § 7-102.
85. Id. § 7-103(b).
86. Id. § 7-104. See also id. § 7-112 (authorizing dismissal if a plan is
not filed within the time affixed by the bankruptcy administrator).
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therefore difficult to see what activity would be left to the bankruptcy judges when the Administrator is virtually87 taking over the
entire administration of the chapter proceedings.
C.

Elimination of the SEC

The creation of the office of bankruptcy administrator will
eliminate the SEC from corporate rehabilitation proceedings. As
stated in the Commission's report:
The administrator will, nevertheless, perform the functions now
delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission in Chapter
X cases of the present Act, including the preparation of an advisory
report on proposed plans and the recommendation of compensa88
tion to be allowed trustees, attorneys, and accountants.
Questions have been raised whether the bankruptcy administrator
can effectively replace the SEC in reorganization proceedings.
Even though the SEC has thirty-five years of experience in corporate rehabilitation, its less active role in recent cases demonstrates
that the SEC may no longer be necessary for rehabilitation proceedings. If this trend is due to a change in attitude by the SEC of
its role as a public watchdog to that of greater concern for the
needs of the corporate debtor and the competence and honesty of
the management, then Chapter VII of the Act is a substantial
improvement over the present system. If this trend towards less
involvement in bankruptcy rehabilitation, on the other hand, is
merely due to an understaffing of the SEC in its bankruptcy
division 9 then the justification for a bankruptcy administration is
even greater. The bankruptcy administrator, being a disinterested
party, would be able to look out for the interests of the public
investor.
The removal of administrative duties from the bankruptcy
judge is a necessary reform, but it is unclear at this time whether
another bureaucratic agency in Washington will solve the problem.
In light of the diminishing role of the SEC in corporate rehabilitation and the discretionary authority given the bankruptcy administrator, passage of the proposed New Bankruptcy Act should not
endanger the rights of public investors by the elimination of the
SEC from bankruptcy proceedings.
Barry L. Ross '77
87. Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) As Proposed By
the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory
and Reality, 47 AM. BANim.L.J. 323, 340 (1973).
88. Report, supra note 79, at 125.

89. See King, The Business Reorganization Chapterof the Proposed Bankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI, XII, 78
CoM.L.J. 429, 430 n. 3 (1973).
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APPENDIX
*0.

1
P,

Case & Year
United States
Realty (1940)
Mecca Temple
(1945)
Transvision
(1955)
General Stores
(1956)
Wilcox-Gay
(1956)
Liberty Baking
(1957)
Grayson-Robinson
(1963)
Crumpton Builders
(1964)
Canandaigua
(1964)
American Trailer
Rentals (1965)
Burton (1965)
Peoples Loan
(1969)
Norman (1969)
Posi-Seal (1972)
KDI (1973)

0

Yes

7,000

Yes

1,834
2d Circuit
Bondholders

No

Suprenie Court

425

Reversed

Yes (a)

Reversed

2d Circuit

Affirmed

No

Yes

7,000

Supreme Court

Affirmed

Yes

No

3,000

6th Circuit

Affirmed

No *

Yes

385

2d Circuit

Reversed

Yes

No

3,470

2d Circuit

Affirmed

No (b)

Yes

2,630

5th Circuit

Reversed

Yes

Yes

6,130

2d Circuit

Reversed

Yes

Yes
No

5,866
3,910

Supreme Court
1st Circuit

Reversed
Remand

Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No
No

3,000+
600
1,700

8th Circuit
10th Circuit
2d Circuit
6th Circuit

Reversed
Reversed
Affirmed
Affirmed

Yes
Yes
No
No *

-

(a) Though no actual evidence of mismanagement, the case does have supportUI

gL

angua.
d5U5.

.

It.

(b) Though not in the majority opinion, mismanagement is suggested in
Judge Clark's dissent.
* Not only is there no evidence of mismanagement, but actual evidence
of highly competent management.

